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Universität zu Köln
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät

Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar - Prof. Schmitz

The Hold-up Problem, Innovations, and Limited Liability

Patrick W. Schmitz

Economics Letters, Vol. 117 (3), 2012, 841–843.

Abstract. An inventor can invest research effort to come up with an innovation. Once an innovation is made, a contract is negotiated and unobservable effort must be exerted to develop a product. In the absence of liability constraints, the inventor`s investment incentives are increasing in his bargaining power. Yet, given limited liability, overinvestments may occur and the inventor`s investment incentives may be decreasing in his bargaining power.

The working paper version is available for download (CEPR Discussion Paper 9050).

The paper is available for download.